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YOUNGSTOWN GOES TO WAR
Michael Stokes Paulsen*

I. THE ENDURING SIGNIFICANCE OF
YOUNGSTOWN
In the spring of 2001-before the war came-the student
editors of the Minnesota Law Review were casting about ideas
for a symposium topic for 2002. I suggested an issue commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer/ the famous "Steel Seizure Case" decided by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1952. A quizzical e-mail came back,
asking, "Why does Youngstown matter? Where is it taking us?"
I laughed sadly, not quite sure whether to be disappointed
at the student editors' ignorance of Youngstown's historical and
ongoing significance, angry at their constitutional law professors'
failure to communicate that significance to them, or simply
amused as the naivete and short-term perspective of second-year
law students looking for immediate "hot topic" relevance at a
time when constitutional issues of foreign policy, war powers,
national security, and separation of powers were not foremost in
people's minds.
A lot has changed since then. In the world after September
11, 2001, there can no longer be any doubt: Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer is one of the most significant Supreme Court
decisions of all time. The decision resolved a major constitutional crisis, and it did so during time of war and at a crucial
juncture in the nation's political history. It resolved the crisis
correctly, with both immediate and long-term important effect.
Youngstown's holding-that the President of the United States
possesses no inherent, unilateral legislative power in time of war
or emergency-and equally so the analysis the Court's majority
and principal concurring opinions have proven enduringly rele* Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. My thanks to
Dan Farber for comments and Heather Olson for research assistance.
I.
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vant to nearly every constitutional issue of war and peace, foreign policy, domestic legislative power, presidential power, and
even judicial power that has confronted the United States in the
past fifty years. Youngstown is one of the truly "great" cases-in
every sense of the word- in the American constitutional law
canon.
Consider for a moment what the decision did: Youngstown
holds that the President, as chief executive, may not "execute"
laws of his own making: the President of the United States may
not constitutionally legislate on his own authority, ever. The
President is not a legislator except in the limited capacities in
which Article I and Article II authorize his participation in the
legislative process via the veto, the discretion to recommend
measures, and the power to adjourn Congress in case of disagreement between the two houses with respect to the time of
adjournment. He may not enact domestic legislation unilaterally, by executive decree, but may only carry into effect enactments of the legislature or execute his own constitutional powers- which pointedly do not include any general legislative
powers. And this remains true even in the case of war or national emergency.
This is a huge constitutional principle, and one that is absolutely foundational to American constitutional government. It is
a principle that seems perfectly obvious today. But it was one
that was at some risk in the immediate post-World War II era, in
the aftermath of the rise of the New Deal's "administrative
state" and in the dawn of the incipient "national security state"
created by nuclear weaponry and the Cold War. Youngstown
strangled, at a crucial moment in our nation's history, the shocking assertion- and this was precisely President Harry S Truman's assertion-that the President possesses inherent domestic
legislative power during time of (unauthorized) war initiated by
the President. Had Youngstown gone the other way- had it
gone wrong and Truman's claim of unilateral presidential legislative power prevailed-we would be living under a significantly
different, more dangerous, constitutional regime than the one we
have today.
Further, Youngstown holds, by necessary implication, that
the President is not and cannot be the sole judge of the scope of
his own constitutional and statutory powers. The Supreme
Court can and will (sometimes) rule on such constitutional questions. And it can and will (sometimes) rule against the President
of the United States, even in times of war or national emergency.
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This significant and seemingly obvious point is obvious today
only because Youngstown was in fact decided by the Supreme
Court fifty years ago, because of the way in which it was decided
(against President Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills),
and because Truman acquiesced in the Court's ruling. Thus, the
judiciary's view prevailed in a major constitutional confrontation
with the President of the United States concerning the scope of
presidential power.
None of this was at all obvious or inevitable in 1952. Indeed, each of these features of Youngstown is rather remarkable.
Youngstown showed that the judiciary will not (necessarily) abstain from decision of constitutional questions concerning the
scope of the President's constitutional powers, even in matters
touching on war, foreign affairs, national security, and national
emergency. This is a principle of tremendous significance, even
though it has been compromised and abandoned-sporadically,
selectively, and inconsistently-over the course of the past halfcentury, through the vehicle of the Court's "political question"
doctrine.
The fact that the Court was willing, arguably for the first
time in our Nation's history, not only to issue a ruling on the
merits but to rule against the President of the United States on a
question of the scope of the President's constitutional powers
makes Youngstown of singular importance. Youngstown is to
executive power what Marbury v. Madison 2 is to legislative
power, only more so. Marbury was, at most, a weak assertion of
judicial power over the legislature, and not at all an assertion of
judicial supremacy over the other branches of the federal government.3 The Court in Marbury pointedly refrained from asserting any general constitutional control of executive actions, 4
asserting (but not actually exerting) authority over executive
branch officials only in the most limited context of nondiscretionary "ministerial" actions. 5 Youngstown, in contrast, is
a bold assertion of judicial power over the conduct of the President in matters concerning the scope of the President's constitu2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L.J. 217, 241-45, 257-62 (1994); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-Five Years, 83
Minn. L. Rev. 1337, 1349-59 (1999).
4. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 (explicitly denying the existence of judicial
power to "intermeddle with the prerogatives of the executive").
5. Marbury, 5 U.S. {1 Cranch) at 171 (holding that mandamus was proper to compel performance of a purely "ministerial" act).
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tional authority. It is probably the Supreme Court's first genuine assertion and exercise of the Court's modern claim of constitutional interpretive supremacy over the actions of the President of the United States, in a case where such a claim really
mattered. 6 The claim of judicial supremacy was not made in express terms, as the Court would come to make it six years later,
in Cooper v. Aaron, and repeatedly in cases in the five decades
since Youngstown. 7 Rather, the claim of supremacy in Youngstown was implicit in the Court's action: it upheld an injunction
against the enforcement of the President's orders, nullifying a
presidential executive order in time of war.
And the nullification stuck. This is perhaps the most significant feature of the case of all. Youngstown is remarkable in that
President Truman accepted and obeyed the Court's decision,
even though he apparently disagreed with it quite strongly, establishing the political precedent of judicial supremacy through
presidential acquiescence in the Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Constitution. 8 Again, this is a commonplace today. But it
is a commonplace, I submit, only because of Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer and Truman's acquiescence. No prior Supreme Court decision genuinely claimed judicial supremacy over
6. See Paulsen, 83 Minn. L. Rev at 1339 n.lO (cited in note 3).
7. See, e.g. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (referring to the "responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[I)t is the
responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (again describing the Court as "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (Court claiming to be "invested with the authority to ... speak
before all others" on the meaning of the Constitution); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 616 & n. 7 (2000) ("[S)ince Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.").
8. David McCullough, in his Pulitzer Prize-winning biography of Truman, relates
Truman's incredulity at the district court opinion against him, his statement that he
would be '"terribly shocked, disappointed and disturbed'" if the Supreme Court were to
decide against him, and his anger at the ultimate decision. David McCullough, Truman
900-01 (Simon & Schuster, 1992). McCullough then recounts Justice Hugo Black's fencemending invitation of President Truman and the Justices to a party at Black's home in
Old Town Alexandria. "At the start of the evening, Truman, though polite, seemed 'a
bit testy,' remembered William 0. Douglas. 'But after the bourbon and canapes were
passed, he turned to Hugo and said, "Hugo, I don't much care for your law, but, by golly,
this bourbon is good.""' ld. at 901.
In his memoirs, former President Truman wrote that "[w)hatever the six justices of
the Supreme Court meant by their differing opinions, [the President) must always act in a
national emergency .... The President, who is Commander in Chief and who represents
the interest of all the people must [be] able to act at all times to meet any sudden threat
to the nation's security." Harry S. Truman, 2 Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope 478
(Doubleday, 1956).

2002)

YOUNGSTOWN GOES TO WAR

219

the President in matters involving interpretation of the President's constitutional powers and prerogatives. No prior judicial
confrontation with the executive resulted in so complete a victory for the Court.9
Judicial triumphs tend to beget more judicial triumphs-and
sometimes judicial triumphalism and hubris. It is probably only
a slight exaggeration to say that if there had been no Youngstown there would have been no Brown v. Board of Education, 10
no Cooper v. Aaron, 11 no Warren Court criminal procedure and
civil rights revolution, no United States v. Nixon, 12 no Roe v.
Wade 13 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 14 Still more, had
Youngstown played out differently in the end- had Truman resisted or evaded the Court's judgment against his seizure of the
steel industry-the aftermath of the Nixon Tapes case might
have played out differently, too. Had Truman successfully held
on to the steel mills in the face of an adverse decision, Nixon
probably would have held on to the tapes, too, no matter what
the Court said. And perhaps the Court would not even have
tried to order Nixon to produce the tapes in the first place. Finally, if Youngstown had been decided the other way, The Pentagon Papers Case 15 probably would have played out differently,
too. The federal government probably would have won in court
the power to enjoin a newspaper's publication of materials the
government deems detrimental to national security (or affirmance of an executive order banning such publication). 16 Or,
had Youngstown been decided as it was but Truman successfully
defied the judgment, Nixon might have seized the printing

9. In stark contrast, compare Chief Justice Taney's writ of habeas corpus directed
at President Lincoln, at the outset of the Civil War, in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144
(C.C.D. Md. 1861). Lincoln ignored the writ. For that story, see Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 81 (1993).
10. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
II. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
12. 418 u.s. 683 (1974).
13. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
14. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
15. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ("The Pentagon Papers Case")16. Id. In The Pentagon Papers Case, the Court rejected, 6-3, the government's application for an injunction against publication of classified government documents describing the history of the government's decision-making process with respect to involvement in the war in Vietnam, with several concurring justices (whose votes were
necessary to the judgment) relying in substantial part on Youngstown. See 403 U.S. at
740 (White, J., with whom Stewart, J., joins, concurring); id. at 742, 745-46 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
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presses of The New York Times and The Washington Post and
ignored any judicial decrees to the contrary. 17
In short, Youngstown in no insubstantial measure accounts
for the modern reality of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation; for presidential, congressional, and popular acquiescence to that reality; for the resultant possibility of the results
in Brown, Nixon, and The Pentagon Papers Case and possibly
many others; for the fact that presidential war powers remain
constitutionally limited and that such limitations are, at least in
substantial part, honored even in an era of nuclear weapons and
even under conditions of emergency; and for the current dominant paradigm through which most important constitutional
questions of war, foreign affairs, and separation-of-powers issues
in general are understood and evaluated by Congress, the President, and the courts. That is a lot to say for one case. 18
The enduring significance of Youngstown may have been
underplayed in the years between the denouement of the Cold
War in (roughly) September 1991 and the beginning of the present war almost exactly ten years later, in September 2001. A
child of the 1990s-and law students at the turn of the twentyfirst century-might be forgiven for not immediately grasping
why a case about temporary presidential seizure of steel mills
during the Korean War remains relevant today. (It is a bit
harder to forgive their constitutional law professors.) In the
world after September 11, however, it is clear that Youngstown,
in addition to being one of the most significant constitutional decisions in our nation's history, is also directly and proximately
relevant to some of the most important constitutional issues confronting the United States government on Youngstown's fiftieth
anniversary, at a time when our nation is once again at war.
In the remainder of this essay, I will answer the student editor's compound question-"Why does Youngstown matter?
Where is it taking us?" -with specific reference to the world in
which we find ourselves after September 11, 2001. Specifically, I

17. David McCullough's biography of President Truman reports that Truman,
asked at a press conference in advance of the Youngstown decision whether his rationale
for seizing the steel mills might equally sustain seizing the presses, answered that,
"(u]nder similar circumstances, the President of the United States has to act for whatever
is best for the country." Quoted in McCullough, Truman at 900 (cited in note 8).
18. As Professor Bellia notes in her contribution to this symposium, it is therefore
quite ironic that Youngstown initially was greeted by confident dismissals of the decision
as containing shallow analysis unlikely to be of much continuing significance. Patricia L.
Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19 Const. Comm. 87,87-90 (2002).
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will address Youngstown's relevance to war, and especially to
presidential power to conduct the present War on Terrorism.
My thesis is that Youngstown is highly relevant to war powers, supplying the proper paradigms for applying the Constitution's overlapping allocations of war power to Congress and the
President. Both Justice Black's majority opinion and Justice
Jackson's more celebrated concurrence state sound principles of
law, completely consistent with each other, that properly guide
present interpreters in evaluating the Constitution's division of
powers concerning war and peace. Properly viewed, Youngstown creates a paradigm of three-branch constitutional interpretation with respect to these issues, an approach consonant with
the Constitution's separation-of-powers generally. The scope of
presidential war power depends on the President's interpretation
of the scope of his constitutional powers in this area; on Congress's interpretation of the scope of the President's constitutional powers in this area (in addition to its specific delegations
of power to the President); and on the judiciary's interpretation
of the scope of the President's and Congress's constitutional
powers in light of the interpretation of these powers by those
other branches. 19
On this view, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (the
"WPR") 20 and the September 18, 2001 "Authorization for Use
of Military Force" (which I will call "The 9-18-01 Resolution") 21
are critical acts of congressional constitutional interpretation
with important implications for evaluating the scope of presidential war power. The War Powers Resolution is in many respects
a highly contestable congressional constitutional interpretation
of the scope of presidential war powers in the absence of a decla19. In this respect, I believe Youngstown is consistent with a position I have argued
in greater detail in other writing: that the power of constitutional interpretation is a divided, shared power of all three branches of the federal government, not the sole and
exclusive province of the courts. See Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 217 (cited in note
3); Paulsen, 83 Minn. L. Rev. at 1337 (cited in note 3).
20. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555-559, codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994 and Supp. V 1999).
21. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001). The resolution was passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, and signed by
President Bush on September 18, 2001. Some commentators have referred to this enactment as Congress's "September 14 Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force."
Curtis A Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 Green Bag 249, 252 & n.l8 (2002). Which date is correct turns on whether one
thinks that congressional legislation authorizing the President to use military force, including declarations of war, must comply with Article I section 7's requirement of presentment to the President. See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke L.J. 27,81-86
(1991).
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ration of war or functionally-equivalent congressional authorization of war. Some features of the War Powers Resolution are
obviously unconstitutional. 22 But in at least one respect the War
Powers Resolution is plainly legitimate and fits neatly within the
three-category paradigm established by Justice Jackson's
Youngstown concurrence. 23 The War Powers Resolution establishes a rule of construction concerning congressional action and
inaction that effectively excludes what I will call, borrowing from
Justice Jackson's taxonomy, "Category II wars" -that is, wars
that might otherwise be thought legally justified by implicit
presidential war-making authority resulting from "congressional
inertia, indifference, or quiescence." 24 The War Powers Resolution says, almost in so many words, that insofar as legitimate
presidential war-making power might be thought to depend on
an inference from congressional action or inaction, Congress has
adopted a standing statutory rule specifically repudiating any
such inference. As far as Congress is concerned, there are to be
no more "Category II wars" thought to be impliedly authorized
by treaty provisions, appropriations acts, or any other legislative
action (or inaction) short of specific authorization. 25 Moreover,
to the extent the President would interpret the Constitution as
permitting him to introduce armed forces into combat situations
on his own authority, Congress's interpretation is that the Constitution does not authorize such unilateral action- and certainly
not beyond sixty days. 26
In this respect, the September 18, 2001 "Authorization for
Use of Military Force" constitutes a major paradigm shift-a watershed constitutional event. While the 9-18-01 Resolution is, in
form, an authorization purporting to fit within the parameters of
the War Powers Resolution, 27 the Resolution creates very nearly
22. I discuss the "legislative veto" provisions of the War Powers Resolution below.
See infra p. 246.
23. In briefest tenns, Justice Jackson thought presidential power to fluctuate depending on where it falls along a continuum from "Category I" (legislatively authorized
presidential action) to "Category II" (unclear legislative action in an area of uncertain
allocation of constitutional power between the President and Congress) to "Category
III" (legislative denial of authorization to the President, such that the President's action
is proper only if it lies within the President's constitutional powers that exist independent
of legislative action). Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). For further elaboration of this paradigm, see infra at pp. 224-225.
24. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
25. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a).
26. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541, 1547(a). I discuss below the effect of sections 1542-1546 of
the War Powers Resolution as creating a de facto "safe harbor" for unilateral presidential
action. See infra pp. 247-249.
27. Authorization for Use of Military Force,§ 2(b)(l), 115 Stat. at 224 ("Consistent
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plenary presidential power to conduct the present war on terrorism, through the use of military and other means, against enemies both abroad and possibly even within the borders of the
United States, as identified by the President, and without apparent limitation as to duration, scope, and tactics. The September
18 Resolution has both "Youngstown Category I" and "Youngstown Category II" elements, and triggers broad presidential constitutional power under both heads. The President is specifically
authorized (Category I) and delegated power in broad terms to
use force against persons, nations, or organizations he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the attacks of
September 11, 2001, or who harbor such persons or organizations. That is a sweeping delegation of the war power. Moreover, the Resolution declares, in its final "whereas" clause, that
"the President has authority under the Constitution to take action
to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the
United States." 28 This near-unanimous congressional interpretation of the Constitution29 essentially authorizes the President to
conduct, in Youngstown terms, a "Category II war" on terrorism
going beyond even the sweeping terms of the specificallyauthorized "Category I war" against those the President determines are responsible for, or assisted, the attacks of September
11, 2001. Indeed, given how sweeping and unequivocal this congressional endorsement of presidential constitutional power is,
one might well refer to this aspect of the 9-18-01 Resolution as
recognizing presidential power to wage a "Category I~ War."
Part II of this essay discusses the majority and principal
concurring opinions in Youngstown and defends the proposition
that these opinions can be seen as establishing a consistent paradigm of three-branch constitutional interpretation in matters of
war and foreign affairs. Part III then looks at the War Powers
Resolution of 1973 and the 9-18-01 Resolution as different applications of this paradigm, with important implications for the present War on Terrorism and for our understanding of war powers
generally.
with section 1547(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this
section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
section S(b) of the War Powers Resolution."); § 2(b)(2) ("Nothing in this resolution
supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.").
28. Authorization for Use of Military Force,115 Stat. 224 (2001) (emphasis added).
29. The Senate vote on S.J. Res. 23 (became Pub. L. No. 107-40) was 98-0. Vote 281
(available at <http://scnate.gov/legislativevote1071/vote-0028l.html>). The House vote
on H.J. Res. 64 (became Pub. L. No. 107-40) was 420-1. Vote 342 (available at <http://
clerkweb.gov/cgi -bin/vote.exe ?year=2001&rollnumbcr=342>).

224

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 19:215

II. YOUNGSTOWN AS THREE-BRANCH
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Everybody seems to agree that Youngstown established the
dominant paradigm for evaluating disputes between Congress
and the President over the scope of their respective constitutional powers. Ironically, though, nobody seems to agree on
what that paradigm is.
It has become fashionable for some academic commentators, and even for the Court itself, to note the eclipse of Justice
Hugo Black's majority opinion by Justice Robert Jackson's concurrence, in terms of influence in establishing the governing
paradigm. 30 To be sure, Jackson's concurrence is marvelous.
The opinion is characteristically lucid, full of the grace and sophistication that makes Jackson's writing so persuasive and enjoyable to read. Its analysis is (in the main) cautious and precise.
The opinion provides the tremendously influential and useful
three-category framework that offers a workable and simple, but
not grossly oversimplified, general approach to separation of
powers issues involving presidential versus congressional authorTo greatly compress: Under Jackson's analysis,
ity.
"[p ]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, dependinH
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress"
and thus fall along a continuum, roughly marked by three broad
categories of congressional action: "Category I" consists of situations where Congress has authorized presidential action, triggering the President's core Article II "executive power" to carry
into effect legislative action in addition to whatever unilateral,
independent constitutional powers the President possesses.

30. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981); Nixon v. Adm'r of
Gen. Serv. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) ("[T]he unanimous Court [in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974)] essentially embraced Mr. Justice Jackson's view, expressed in his
concurrence in Youngstown ...."); Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 342 (Foundation Press, 14th ed. 2001) ("Of all the opinions in the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Jackson's has been the most widely relied on in later decisions."); Tara
L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day
America, 28 J. Legis. 1, 62 (2002) ("Despite the numerous opinions issued in Youngstown
upholding the importance of a system of checks and balances, Justice Jackson's concurrence may have been the most important .... "); Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review & the
President's Statutory Powers, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1982) ("It is Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in Youngstown that has most influenced subsequent analysis.")
(citation omitted); Paul Gerwirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 343, 352 ("Today it is almost universally believed that the more narrowly
framed concurring opinions in that case [Youngstown] capture what it really stands for.")
See also Bellia, supra note 18 at 89 n. 11.
31. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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"Category II" consists of situations where the Constitution's allocation of power between Congress and the President is, as applied to the situation at hand, uncertain or indeterminate (the
famous "zone of twilight" 32 ) and where the existence or extent of
Congress's legislative authorization, approval, or acquiescence
(to move, progressively, from stronger to weaker claims of legislative action triggering enhanced executive power) is also unclear.33 Finally, Jackson's "Category III" consists of situations
where the President takes action inconsistent with Congress's
legislative directions (which Jackson expands, less helpfully, to
legislative actions "expressed or implied" 34 ), in which case the
President must possess independent constitutional power that
fully justifies his action irrespective of what Congress says.35
Justice Jackson's opinion is more comprehensive, possesses
greater subtly, and has broader explanatory power than does
Justice Black's majority opinion. But it is a mistake to suggest
(as some do) that Justice Jackson's concurrence and Justice
Black's majority opinion are inconsistent with one another. The
two opinions are perfectly harmonious: Jackson's analytic approach is right-and so is Black's.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court is straightforward, direct, and elegant-a masterpiece of textual and formal analysis.
In its own, different way, it is as great a work of judicial art as
Jackson's concurrence. It has the simplicity and beauty of apefectly-reasoned four-line proof of some proposition of Euclidian
geometry: A president's power to act must stem from either an
act of Congress (the "executive Power") or from his independent constitutional powers. No congressional act authorized this
presidential action. Nor could President Truman's order be sustained under any independent presidential power: The military
power of Commander-in-Chief does not include a power to conscript private resources; that "is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not its military authorities." 36 The "executive" power is a
power to carry into execution laws passed by Congress, not a
freestanding legislative power of the President. 37 Past practice to
the contrary certainly does not alter the Constitution's funda-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
at 638.
at 587.
at 587-88.
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mental allocation of powers. 38 Nor does a claim of exigency. 39
Black's majority opinion is not quite that short, but it almost
is. The tone is flat, dry, prosaic. It is elegant but not eloquent.
It is complete in itself but certainly not a comprehensive treatment of its subject matter. Nowhere to be found is any extended
discussion of hypothetical situations, exceptions, limitations,
contingencies, doubtful cases, or broad categories. In this respect, it differs markedly in style from the concurrence of Justice
Jackson. But it does not differ markedly in substance. Justice
Jackson's more grand concurrence simply addresses a broader
range of circumstances implicated by the Court's discussion of
presidential versus congressional power. But these circumstances were not actually presented by the facts of the case before the Court.
Interestingly, Justice Black's opinion for the Court can be
seen as fitting almost perfectly into Jackson's Category I-II-III
analysis, but without using that terminology-and without falling
into the small lapses in analytic rigor in Jackson's concurrence
(and the somewhat more serious lapses in Justice Frankfurter's).40 When Black writes that "[t]he President's power, if
any, to issue the order [seizing the steel mills] must stem either
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself,"41 he is
engaging in category-talk, without the label. There must either
be legislative authorization for the President's action (Category
I) or there must be independent presidential power (Category
III).
Category II is not excluded either, at least not entirely.
Rather, for Black, such a category appears to be a subset of the
broader category of legislative authorization, where authorization is implied rather than express: "There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as
he did here," Black's opinion says. But he turns to Category IItype analysis in the very next sentence: "Nor is there any act of
Congress ... from which such a power can fairly be implied." 42
This is a quintessential Category II inquiry. Can congressional
38. Id. at 588 ("Congress has not ... lost its exclusive constitutional authority to
make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution").
39. Id. at 589 ("The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the
Congress alone in both good and bad times.").
40. I discuss these presently. See infra pp. 227-228. See also infra at pp. 234-236
(addressing flaws in Jackson's general approach).
41. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
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action- or inaction- be construed as authorization or acquiescence sufficient to permit the President to act? Black considers
this possibility and rejects it on the facts of the case. First, he
notes the Government's concession that neither the Selective
Service Act of 1948 nor the Defense Production Act of 1950 justified the steel seizure. Next, he discusses the fact that the "seizure technique" was "not only unauthorized" but that Congress,
after considering creating such a power, "refused to adopt that
method of settling labor disputes" in its enactment of the TaftHartley Act. (The concurrences make a bit more of this datum,
but not to improved effect, as I discuss presently.t3 Black's conclusion from congressional consideration and non-enactment of
a seizure power is straightforward: "[T]he plan Congress
adopted in that Act did not provide for seizure under any circumstances."44 In short, Congress's failure to authorize such
presidential action should be construed as, well, not authorizing
such presidential action. Thus, Congress had not by legislative
action created express or "implied" presidential authority.
This is "Category II" analysis, similar in the topics it addresses to Justice Jackson's discussion within that category. Indeed, in certain respects it is better Category II analysis than that
of the concurring opinions: it is simpler, plainer, and avoids the
obvious analytic error of Justice Frankfurter's concurrence (in
which Justice Jackson concurredt5 of treating Congress's consideration of but failure to enact a provision as the equivalent of
an affirmative statutory prohibition of such action. 46
43. Id. at 586; see infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
44. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586.
45. Id. at 639 n.8 (Jackson, J., concurring) (embracing Justice Frankfurter's concurrence on this point).
46. Id. at 602-603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The authoritatively expressed purpose of Congress to disallow such power to the President and to require him ... to put
the matter to Congress and ask for specific authority from it, could not be more decisive if
it had been written into §§ 206-210 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947....
Grafting upon the words (of the Act] a purpose of Congress thus unequivocally expressed is the regular legislative mode for defining the scope of an Act of Congress ....
By the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Congress said to the President, 'You
may not seize .... "') (emphasis added); see id. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring) (committing similar error of treating non-enactment as apparent equivalent of prohibition).
Frankfurter's approach seems utterly indefensible. Congress's "purpose" of not allowing the seizure technique of course could have been more authoritatively expressed if
it had been written into §§ 206-210 of the Taft-Hartley Act as a prohibition. Congress
did not say to the President 'You may not seize.' Congress said 'You may do this and this
and this.' To be sure, if one's baseline rule is that the President has no legitimate authority to "execute" anything more than what Congress has legislated, then the effect of a
failure to enact is to withhold authority, whether or not Congress considered and voted
up-or-down on the proposed power not enacted. But that is Justice Black's preferred
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The only thing even arguably missing from Justice Black's
majority opinion is discussion of what to do if the Constitution's
allocation of powers between Congress and the President is, as
applied to a certain question, uncertain or indeterminate, and
whether indicia of congressional "inertia, indifference, or quiescence" (to use Justice Jackson's language) might be construed
more generously in favor of presidential authority under such
circumstances. But such discussion was not truly "missing" because such a situation was not presented on the facts of the
Youngstown case. As construed by Black (for the majority), the
Constitution's allocation of power concerning the seizure of domestic industries was not at all uncertain: The Commander-inChief power is not a power to seize domestic industries or otherwise to conscript people or resources. That is a legislative
power. 47 The "executive Power" is only a power to execute laws,
not to make or enlarge them. 48 Nor does the President possess a
general, non-textual emergency power to legislate: "The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in good and bad times." 49 Youngstown did not inconstitutional baseline and (apparently) not Justice Frankfurter's or Justice Jackson's,
despite their willingness to sign on to the majority opinion. Under Black's analysis, it
appears sufficient that Congress did not affirmatively enact seizure authority; Congress
either authorized presidential seizure of industry or it did not. (Of course, like any good
opinion-writer, Black notes the additional fact in favor of his view, that Congress rejected
a proposal to include such seizure authority." ld. at 586 & nn.3-5.) Frankfurter's mistake
(and Jackson's, following him) is believing that congressional authorization sometimes
can be inferred from something less than an enactment passed in accordance with the
procedure set forth in Article I, section 7 of the Constitution. Since, under such an approach, authorization can come from something less than enactment, repudiation of such
authority requires something more than non-enactment. Thus, Frankfurter (and Jackson) need to ratchet-up legislative history to the level of a specific statutory prohibition
in order for the President not to have such authority. Black's approach does not require
this. The President lacks authority if it has not been given to him.
(It is little wonder that a subsequent Court that wished to find implicit authorization
for or consent to presidential action would be inclined to emphasize the approach of the
Youngstown concurrences, rather than the majority opinion. See, e.g., Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 660-61,668-69,674-78, 686.)
47. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 ("This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for
its military authorities."). As Justice Jackson's concurrence amplifies, it is Congress, not
the President, that has the power to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a
navy; nor does the power of Commander-in-Chief "of the Army and Navy" make the
President Commander-in-Chief of the Nation. ld. at 641-43 (Jackson, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 587-88. On this point, Justice Black's simpler analysis is far more coherent and persuasive than Justice Jackson's elaborate, convoluted disavowal of "the rigidity
dictated by a doctrinaire textualism" in preference for according enumerated powers
"the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications,"
id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring), while simultaneously rejecting a broad interpretation
of the general grant of "the executive Power" because of the subsequent textual enumeration of certain specific powers.
49. Id. at 589.
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volve any question of uncertain distribution of constitutional
power. It was a Category III case, pure and simple. President
Truman was legislating a seizure of domestic industry, and such
legislation was not authorized by any Article II power or by any
congressional delegation of power.
But if Youngstown did not truly present a case where the
Constitution's distribution of powers was uncertain, what should
be the approach where such uncertainty does exist-as is often
the case in matters of war and foreign affairs? Justice Black's
majority opinion omits any discussion of this situation, probably
because it was not presented by the facts of the case and any
such discussion would have been dicta inappropriate for the
Opinion of the Court as a whole.
It was left to Justice Jackson's concurrence (and the other
concurrences) to supply such dicta. Jackson's approach does not
contradict Black's. Rather, it can be understood as stating a further-and I submit correct-second-order rule for separation-ofpowers disputes, applicable where the Constitution's allocation
of powers between Congress and the President is, as applied to a
given situation, unclear, or indeterminate, or involves overlapping spheres of authority. Jackson's Category II can best be
seen as a rule of (i) judicial deference (ii) to an authoritativelyexpressed congressional constitutional interpretation of the scope
of presidential power, (iii) where the Constitution's allocation of
power between Congress and the President on the matter in question falls within a legitimate range of uncertainty or its application
to particular circumstances is unclear. It is a rule that recognizes
that the Court's interpretation of the scope of presidential power
should, in doubtful cases, take into account the President's and
Congress's interpretations of the scope of such presidential
power.
Jackson's concurrence does not quite express the principle
this way. It is not cast in terms of congressional "interpretation"
of the Constitution but, more generally and diffusely, about
drawing inferences from congressional action or inaction. In addition (as I will discuss presently), it imposes no discipline for determining when Congress's views have been authoritatively expressed. But the famous Jackson opinion is all about how
interpretation of the Constitution, in uncertain cases involving
separation of powers between Congress and the President,
should be affected by the views of the actors themselves as reflected in their actions. Jackson's opinion is quintessentially
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about the legitimate and proper effect on the judiciary of the
constitutional interpretations of the political branches.
I call this a "second-order" rule. It is second-order in the
sense that it is not a rule of direct constitutional interpretation,
but a rule concerning what to do where inquiry under first-order
principles of interpretation (such as consideration of the Constitution's text, structure, and historical evidence of original meaning) fails to yield a sufficiently determinate answer, or yields a
range of legitimate answers none of which is sufficiently preferable to the others in terms of first-order interpretive principles
that it can be called the "right" answer. 5°
Youngstown's "Category II" is best understood as a category that consists of such questions. It is a rule of decision-a
"default rule" -about what a court should do on a separation of
powers question involving the line between presidential and
congressional power where the "right" answer is not satisfactorily clear even after careful study of constitutional text, structure
and history. It is a rule of judicial deference, not terribly unlike
other such rules of interpretive deference. 51 In short, Category
II is properly a second-order decision rule for the judiciary in
cases that concern the scope of presidential constitutional power
50. Vasan Kesavan and I have argued elsewhere that the Constitution should be
interpreted according to the meaning the words and phrases employed would have had,
considered in historical context and within the context of the document as a whole, to an
ordinary, reasonably-informed reader or speaker of the English language at the time the
text was adopted as law. Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia
Unconstitutional?, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 293,398-99 (2002); Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History (unpublished
manuscript on file with the authors) (forthcoming 2003). This basic proposition can be
refined and qualified in a number of ways, but this statement is sufficient to illustrate
what I mean by "first-order" principles of constitutional interpretation. (There are, obviously, other, competing approaches to first-order constitutional interpretation.) "Second-order" rules are rules governing how to interpret or apply the Constitution when
first-order principles fail to yield tolerably clear answers, or produce a range of legitimate
answers none of which fairly can be privileged over the others.
51. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). See Michael Stokes Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 333 (cited in note
3):
The presumption of constitutionality and the Chevron deference principle suggest a more general rule of judicial restraint:. A court should n.ot su?st~tute its
interpretation of a text for that of the pohucal branches (actmg Withm their
proper spheres) when more t~an one interpretation is possible, ther~ i_s no principled rule supplied by test, history, structure, and precedent that pnvlleges one
reading over the other, and the political branches have acted pursuant to one
such reading.
There are a number of other rules of alleged interpretive deference, some of which
are of highly dubious validity. But that is a topic for another occasion. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Activist Judicial Restraint (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author) (forthcoming 2003).
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vis-a-vis Congress, where there exists a sufficiently clear congressional interpretation of the scope of the President's constitutional power and that interpretation supports the President.
Specifically, where Congress agrees with the President's interpretation of the scope of his constitutional and statutory powers,
the courts should defer to that position, unless it is wrong as a
matter of direct constitutional interpretation. The courts should
not lightly invalidate, on separation of powers grounds involving
congressional versus presidential power, presidential action that
Congress concedes to be within the president's domain. Only if
it can be said, with a sufficient degree of confidence, on firstorder constitutional interpretive principles, that the president's
action is unconstitutional-unconstitutional irrespective of whatever Congress thinks-should a court invalidate it.
This makes sense, on two grounds. The first has to do with
what it means in the first place for a court to say that some
presidential action (or some act of Congress) is "unconstitutional." Practically by definition, it means that the President's
(or Congress's) action is contrary to-in irreconcilable variance
with-some rule of law supplied by the text of the Constitution. 52
What happens when the Constitution is unclear? If there is no
rule supplied by the text, how is a Court to decide? In many
cases, the answer will be simply that the Constitution fails to
supply a legal rule or principle that invalidates the action taken
by the political body (Congress, the President, state legislatures
or governors). Accordingly, the action of the political body
stands, because it cannot be said to be unconstitutional.
This principle is a bit harder to apply in separation-ofpowers cases, where the question is which political body has
governing authority under the Constitution. 53 If the contention
52. This is the core of the reasoning of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177-80 (1803) and of Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Garry Wills, ed. The Federalist Papers
388 (Bantam Books, 1982). The power of judicial review takes as its premise that the
Constitution is a species of law of a higher order than the acts of the legislature or of the
executive (or of the judiciary, I would add). Because courts are charged with applying
the law, they must give effect to the law of superior rather than inferior obligation. Thus,
where the Constitution supplies a rule of law contrary to the rule specified by a legislative enactment, courts must apply the Constitution rather than the statute. If the Constitution does not supply such a rule of law, the rationale for judicial review set forth in
Marbury and Federalist 78 evaporates.
53. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,704-05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
Where a private citizen challenges action of the Government on grounds unrelated to separation of powers, harmonious functioning of the system demands
that we ordinarily give some deference, or a presumption of validity, to the actions of the political branches in what is agreed, between themselves at least, to
be within their respective spheres. But where the issue pertains to separation of
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in a case challenging presidential action is that the President's
act violates the Constitution's separation of powers by invading
the province of Congress, then, if the Constitution's allocation of
powers in this regard is genuinely uncertain or its application to
the particular situation unclear, there needs to be some rule for
deciding how to resolve the legal challenge to the President's action. One possible such rule would be to uphold the presidential
action on the theory that the president's action cannot be said to
violate the Constitution if it is not clear that he lacks the power
at issue. Another possible rule would be just the opposite: invalidate the presidential action, on the theory that the president
only has power where the Constitution clearly bestows it, or
where Congress has granted it by legislation. The former default
rule favors presidential power at the expense of Congress; the
latter favors congressional power at the expense of the President. Each has something to say for it and each has a plausible
textual argument in its favor. 54
But if it is unclear which of these dueling default rules
should prevail, at least it should be clear that where the Constitution's precise allocation of power between Congress and the
President is uncertain or indeterminate the judiciary should defer to a congressional constitutional interpretation that itself defers to presidential power. For in that case, both alternatives
converge in favor of the same result. Thus, when the two political branches are in accord as to how the Constitution's ambiguous allocation of powers between them should play out in a
given context or situation, the Court should accept -indeed, must
accept-the political branch's agreed judgment, for in such a
case, the Constitution supplies no rule of law invalidating the
President's action and the Congress agrees that the President's
action lies within the scope of his power.

powers, and the political branches are (as here) in disagreement, neither can be
presumed correct.
54. The pro-executive view might be thought to flow from the existence of a residual or interstitial "executive power," or some other presidential power under Article II.
The pro-congressional view might be thought to flow from the Necessary and Proper
Clause, U.S. Canst. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, if one construes that clause to constitute an exclusive assignment of the interstitial or implied powers vested by the Constitution "in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," preclusive
of, and pre-emptive of, action by such Departments or Officers regardless of whether
Congress has acted or not-in effect, a "dormant" Necessary and Proper Clause. i"!plied
prohibition on actions by coordinate branches, where such actiOns woul~ fall w1thm the
scope of Congress's (unexercised) Necessary and Proper Clause leg~slatlve power. U.S.
Canst. Art. I, § 8, d. 18.
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The second reason why it is appropriate for courts to accept
Congress's constitutional interpretation in support of presidential power is that the Constitution does not vest interpretive exclusivity with respect to the Constitution's allocation of powers
in the courts in the first place. Rather, it appears to contemplate
more of a three-branch model for construing and applying the
allocation. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 49,
" [t]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the
terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior ri?ht of settling the
boundaries between their respective powers. " 5 The application
of separation-of-powers principles to the power of constitutional
interpretation-and especially constitutional interpretation concerning allocation of powers among the branches-very strongly
suggests a three-branch approach, in which courts accord substantial deference to a common constitutional view embraced by
both Congress and the President that falls within the range of
meaning afforded by an indefinite or overlapping allocation of
constitutional power between them. 56
All of this may be seen as consistent with Justice Jackson's
description of "Category II" constitutional issues, with certain
small differences and refinements. Jackson put the principle this
way:
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as
a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law. 57

Jackson's general statement of the principle is, overall, very
good. There are certain areas where the Constitution's distribution of authority is uncertain, or concurrent. (As I shall argue
presently, the war power is one of them.) In such areas, it should
55. Federalist 49 (Madison) 254,255 (cited in note 52).
56. For a systematic defense of the principle of co-ordinate, co-equal constitutional
interpretive power in all three branches, see Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 217 (cited in
note 3); Paulsen, 83 Minn. L. Rev. at 1347-59 (cited in note 3).
57. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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matter, and matter greatly, what Congress has said and done (or
not done) concerning the scope of the President's powers.
This begs a further question: What should count as authoritative congressional interpretation of the Constitution? Here,
Justice Jackson's approach becomes analytically vulnerable. Indeed, Jackson's concurrence becomes almost hopelessly fuzzy
when it comes to describing what might count as evidence of
congressional "inertia, indifference or quiescence" sufficient to
constitute Congress having "enable[ d]" or "invite~d)" the exercise of "independent presidential responsibility." 8 As noted
earlier, Jackson appears to fall victim to the same analytic error
as Justice Frankfurter: the willingness to construe Congress's
non-enactment of specific authority as sometimes the equivalent
of a prohibition on the exercise of such authority (as in Youngstown itself, in the case of seizure authority) and, apparently,
sometimes as the equivalent of implied authority (or at least enabled or invited action) arising from Congress's inertia, indifference, or quiescence.
This error is similar to the one that has fueled today's debates over the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. The only thing Congress actually enacts into law is the text
of the statute itself. While it might sometimes be legitimate to
look to legislative history in order to ascertain the meaning the
words of the statute had, in context, to those who were using
them (discounted by the fact that such legislative history is now
frequently created precisely to "spin" statutory interpretation,
and by its possible unreliability in other respects), surely the least
legitimate use of such legislative history is to generate nonenacted authority or prohibitions, or effectively to repeal or alter
provisions actually enacted.
The same is true when it comes to interpreting congressional non-enactment for purposes of evaluating the scope of
the President's delegated or constitutional authority to act.
Congress acts only by passing bills that become law. Thus, with
respect to statutorily delegated power, Congress's refusal to
grant seizure authority is not a prohibition of such authority; it is
simply a failure to grant such authority. Likewise, Congress's
grant of certain statutory authority and failure specifically to
prohibit other exercises of power surely does not imply a further
grant, or concession, of such non-enacted authority to the Presi-

58.

ld.
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dent. 59 Nor does anything not enacted by Congress tell us anything authoritative about Congress's constitutional interpretations of presidential power.
The better approach, I submit, is as follows. Congress may
grant statutory authority by enacting it into the text of a statute.
Where Congress has not so granted statutory authority, statutory
authority does not exist. Whether the President possesses such
authority anyway, as a matter of Article II presidential constitutional power, is a different question logically unaffected by the
presence or absence of a grant of statutory authority. Where the
President's independent constitutional power is clear, the presence of statutory authority merely confirms or clarifies such existing presidential constitutional authority. Where presidential
constitutional authority is uncertain, however, Congress's constitutional interpretation of the scope of the President's constitutional powers matters much more. An interpretation supportive
of presidential power reinforces the President's constitutional
position while an interpretation repudiating the President's position weakens it. But Congress's constitutional interpretations
cannot properly be divined from non-enactments, any more than
can statutory grants (or prohibitions) of authority. Just as Congress may legislate authority (or prohibitions) only by passing
laws pursuant to the Article I, section 7 process, so too Congress
may authoritatively express its constitutional views only by passing laws pursuant to the Article I, section 7 process. In short,
statutes count; inferences from non-enactments or from legislative history do not. 60
Once Congress has acted in a properly authoritative manner
by enacting a statute, such enactments should have considerable
force as acts of constitutional interpretation. Indeed, Congress's
enacted constitutional interpretations should enjoy the same
status as authoritative constitutional interpretations of the legislative branch as judicial decisions have as the authoritative constitutional interpretations of the judicial branch. A statute em59. The reasoning of Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), is, of course, inconsistent with my analysis here.
60. In addition, the Senate may authoritatively interpret the Constitution-on behalf of the Senate alone-in the course of exercising its share of any power that it exercises independent of the House of Representatives. Thus, the Senate's final judgments in
cases of impeachment; its consent to treaties; and its approval or rejection of an appointment, each could become the occasion for the Senate authoritatively expressing its
constitutional views. Similarly, the House may be able to express its constitutional views
with respect to impeachment in the course of its decisions to bring or not bring certain
charges.
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bodying a constitutional interpretation should be viewed as
analogous to a judicial decision or precedent interpreting the
Constitution. The branches have simply acted in the respective
ways in which they are authorized by the Constitution to actCongress by exercising the legislative power of passing laws and
the courts by exercising the judicial power of deciding cases. 61
The President's authoritative constitutional interpretations
may come in the context of performing any of the Presidency's
myriad independent and shared constitutional powers: vetoing
bills, issuing pardons, executing laws, recommending measures,
conducting foreign affairs, commanding the nation's armed
forces, or-as with Truman's order in the Youngstown caseissuing executive orders purporting to have the force of law. 62
Jackson's Category 1-11-111 paradigm is properly viewed as addressing the degree of deference to be accorded presidential
constitutional interpretation, at least by the Courts. Somewhat
restated, the framework can be summarized as follows. Category 1: Where the President's interpretation is in accord with
Congress's interpretation of the President's constitutional powers, that agreement has the strongest claim to judicial deference.
In such a case, a court may invalidate the President's action only
if it can be said, unequivocally, that the constitutional judgment
of both the President and Congress is wrong. The President's
constitutional interpretation, supported by Congress's constitutional interpretation, would be (to borrow Justice Jackson's language) "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." 63
Category II: Where it is unclear whether, or the extent to which,
Congress has embraced the President's constitutional position,
the judiciary is left without any helpful assistance in considering
the underlying, first-order issue of the constitutional validity of
the President's action. Reading the tea-leaves of Congress's lack
of authoritative interpretive action does not further the enter61. I believe that the authoritative constitutional interpretations of Congress and of
the courts (and of the President) also should have the same status vis-a-vis each other.
See generally Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 217 (cited in note 3). But that controversial point is not necessary to my position here. My claim here is only that whatever power
of constitutional interpretation Congress possesses, it is exercised by passing legislation,
just as the courts' power of constitutional interpretation is exercised by deciding cases.
62. Sec id. at 241-84 (arguing that the President possesses a power of constitutional
legal review parallel to the judiciary's power of constitutional legal review, and setting
forth the contexts in which it properly might be exercised).
63. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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prise of constitutional interpretation in a particularly meaningful
way. Category III: Where Congress has adopted, by affirmative
legislative enactment within the scope of its constitutional powers, the negative of the President's interpretive position (as it has
in some respects with regard to the war power, for example, in
the War Powers Resolution), the President's interpretive position should enjoy no judicial presumption of validity, or deference. The President's position is right only if it is right, as a matter of constitutional law. The Court is forced to choose between
the constitutional positions asserted, respectively, by the President and by the Congress. 64
How do these principles apply to the power to wage war?
Interpreting the Constitution's allocations of power with respect
to war is one of the most significant, recurrent, and historically
troubled fields of constitutional law. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
did not specifically address itself to, and does not answer, this
question. But it does supply a valuable way of thinking about it.
In that respect, Youngstown is arguably the most important decision ever rendered by the Supreme Court on the question of
constitutional war powers, even though that was not the question
before the Court.
Ill. YOUNGSTOWN GOES TO WAR
The Constitution's allocation of power with respect to war is
simple enough in the abstract, but notoriously ambiguous and
uncertain in its application. To compress the debate drastically:
Traditionally, the "executive power" was understood at the time
of the framing as including the power of war and peace, and all
external relations of the nation. 65 The founding generation so
understood this traditional arrangement, embraced in various
forms by Locke, Blackstone, Montesquieu, and others, 66 but
feared concentration of power and therefore re-assigned to the
Congress the powers to "declare War"; 67 to "raise and support
Armies [and] ... provide and maintain a Navy"; 68 to "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
64.

Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654, 704-05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cited in note

53).
65. For an excellent, comprehensive treatment of the text and historical under·
standing of the Constitution on this point, see Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2001).
66. See id. at 265-72.
67. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 11.
68. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 12; U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 13.
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Forces";69 and to "define and punish. . . . Offences against the
Law of Nations." 70 In addition, the Framers gave Congress the
wonderfully indefinite and enduringly controversial Sweeping
Clause power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." 71
Finally, the Senate was given the power to advise and consent on
ambassadorial (and other) appointments and (by two-thirds
vote) treaty formation. 72
But the President was left with whatever remained of the
traditional "executive power" in matters of war, peace, and foreign affairs, diminished to a significant extent, but not completely, by the re-allocation of some very important, traditionally
executive, powers to Congress. 73 The President was to retain the
traditional executive power over foreign affairs, qualified by the
Senate's check on appointments and shared power in making
any treaty that would have force as United States law. 74 In addition, the President was specifically made "Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States." 75 Finally, history
very strongly suggests-and the Constitutional Convention's debate over and adoption of a congressional power "to declare
War" as distinguished from a power "to make War" tends to
confirm-that the "executive" power was understood at the time
to include a power to defend the nation when attacked or in imminent danger of attack and that Congress's constitutional
power "to declare war" was not meant to displace this traditional
executive power (and duty). 76
69.
70.

U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 14.
U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 10.
71. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
72. U.S. Const. Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2.
73. See generally Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L.J. at 231 (cited in note 65).
74. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 2, cl. 2.
75. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 2, cl. 1.
76. Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L.J. at 285 (cited in note 65); Louis Fisher,
Presidential War Power 6-8 (U. Press of Kansas, 1995).
The President is also charged by oath to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution of the United States, a duty that might well be thought to impose an obligation to
defend the existence of the nation whose Constitution it is, with military force if necessary, against external and internal enemies who seek to destroy or dismember the nation,
and that this duty exists whether Congress has declared war or not. President Abraham
Lincoln thought of the oath in such terms. Letter to Albert Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864) reprinted in Abraham Lincoln, 2 Speeches & Writings, 1859-1865 at 585 (Libr~ry.of America, 1989) ("I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the constitution to the
best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable
means, that government-that nation-of which that constitution was the organic law.")
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The several constitutional provisions suggest a clear but
crude division of power: Congress has the power to initiate or
create a state of war and the President does not. The President
has the remainder of the "executive" power with respect to
war-and Congress does not. This includes the Commander-inChief power to conduct war: the power to "execute," as it were,
any authorized war; the power to decide whether, when, and
how to employ the Nation's armed force in carrying out Congress's authorization to use such force; and the power to decide
when to cease such use of force. In addition, the President has
the traditional executive power to defend the Nation against
sudden attacks and respond to such attacks or imminent threats
as will not admit of delay. Congress does not possess any of
these executive war powers. 77
The obvious problem is that the respective constitutional
war powers of Congress and the President overlap. How they
apply to particular instances is, therefore, not always clear.
Where, for example, does the President's traditional executive
power to defend the nation and repel attacks leave off and Congress's power "to declare War" begin? May a President initiate
military hostilities against another nation, for the purpose of defending the United States against an anticipated attack? Or is
such exercise of force essentially offensive, falling within Congress's exclusive power to declare war? Similarly, how does the
Commander-in-Chief power to wage a congressionallyauthorized war interact with Congress's control of the scope of
authorization? May Congress limit the objectives or means of
war? Or is this an interference with the President's exclusive
power to direct and command the use of military force?
The Presidential Oath Clause does not appear, at least in form, to be a grant of power to
the President. Probably the better understanding is that it imposes a duty with respect to
the exercise of a power granted elsewhere-as in the clause vesting "the executive
Power" in the President-and is an allusion to that power. See Henry P. Monaghan, The
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1993) (noting that Presiden·
tial Take Care and Oath clauses "are simply expressions of the constitutional nature of
'The executive Power'").
77. If the power to defend the nation against sudden attacks lies outside Congress's
power to declare war and wholly within the residual "executive Power" of the President,
Congress may not seek to control the President's exercise of that exclusively presidential
power. Congress's legislative power under the Necessary and Proper Clause may be used
to pass laws that assist the President in carrying out his constitutional duties; or that purport to restrict him to the bounds on his power established by the Constitution (the latter
being Congress's way of interpreting and seeking to enforce the Constitution). But Congress may not enact laws that operate to inhibit the President's exercise of a power that is
legitimately within the scope of the President's constitutional powers under Article II of
the Constitution.
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It is precisely for issues of this type-issues of separation of
powers and overlapping of powers- that the opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube provide useful paradigms. The approach of
Justice Black's majority opinion is exactly the right place to start
when considering the President's power to employ military
force. To paraphrase Black's opinion: The President's power, if
any, to employ military force must stem either from congressional authorization or from the Constitution itself (that is, from
the President's independent Article II constitutional powers).
Some cases are easy: Where Congress has declared war on an
enemy nation or entity, the President has clear constitutional
power to employ military force against that enemy. (In Jackson's taxonomy, this is a "Category I" war power situation. The
President's power is at its apex, because he is acting pursuant to
explicit congressional authority to execute all the constitutional
powers of Congress with respect to this matter, plus whatever
independent constitutional powers the President possesses with
respect to the matter. 78 )
Absent such congressional authorization, the President's authority to employ military force must be found in some provision
of the Constitution. 79 As noted, the Constitution divides the war
power between Congress and the President. Each allocation of
power must be given effect. A construction that would permit
Congress to control the conduct of military hostilities-the execution of war-or disable the President from exercising the residual executive power of defending the Nation against attack is
not consistent with the Constitution. Equally, however, a construction of the Constitution that would give the President the
entire power with respect to war-the decision whether to initiate military hostilities with another nation or enemy entity-is
not consistent with the Constitution. It is thus also an easy case
under the Constitution (however much this constitutional principle historically has been honored in its breach) that the President does not possess legitimate legal authority to initiate hostilities between the United States and another nation of a
magnitude and intensity sufficient to constitute "war" without
congressional authorization, absent a situation of sudden or imminent attack. (In Jackson's terms, this is the "Category III"
war power situation: the President's power is at its lowest, and
unilateral presidential action can be sustained only if the Presi-

78.
79.

See Youngstown, 343 at 635-36 (Jackson, J., concurring).
ld. at 585, 587 (majority opinion).
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dent has independent constitutional power to take the Nation to
war.) Just as President Truman did not have legitimate constitutional power to seize the nation's steel mills without congressional authorization, the President does not have legitimate constitutional power to take the nation to "war"- to initiate
hostilities, as opposed to repelling sudden or imminent attacks
on the United States-without congressional authorization. 80
But there are also hard cases-"Category II" war power
cases- where the President and Congress "may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." 81 Justice
Jackson's Youngstown concurrence supplies a valuable paradigm
for determining how the war power applies in these situations.
Because presidential and congressional war powers overlap, it
matters greatly how Congress, through actual legislative enactments, has interpreted the Constitution with respect to the
President's constitutional authority to employ military force.
Where Congress has granted the President authority, by formal
declaration of war or by comparable statutory authorization or
delegation, the question is chiefly one of the meaning and legal
effect of its enactment, when coupled with the President's constitutional powers. Where Congress by legislation has enacted a
view or interpretation of the branches' respective constitutional
war powers, either in connection with authorizing the President's
use of military force in a specific context (as I shall argue is the
case with the 9-18-01 Resolution) or as freestanding legislation
(as with the War Powers Resolution of 1973), the question is
whether Congress's enacted constitutional interpretation reinforces, resists, or simply does not affect, the President's claim of
constitutional authority to act and how such congressional reinforcement, resistance, or neutrality with respect to the Presi-

80. Employing the paradigms of Youngstown, the conclusion seems unavoidablenotwithstanding how hard the Court in Youngstown worked to avoid it-that President
Truman's commitment of U.S. forces to the Korean War was unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
id. at 587 (majority opinion) (rejecting "Commander in Chief' power as justification for
seizure without addressing constitutionality of Korean War); id. at 643 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I do not, however, find it necessary or appropriate to consider the legal status
of the Korean enterprise to discountenance argument based on it."). There is not much
room for doubt that the Korean War was, if not at its inception very shortly thereafter, a
"war" within the meaning of the Constitution. Congress did not declare war or authorize
military action in any way. Truman purported to be acting pursuant to authority conferred by the United Nations, but nothing in the U.N. treaty committed the United States
to military action other than through the nation's constitutional processes and the United
States constitutional process was never employed to authorize use of military force. See
Fisher Presidential War Power at 84-91 (cited in note 76).
81. Youngstown, at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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dent's claimed authority should affect the constitutional calculus
in such doubtful war powers cases.
It would be foolish to attempt (not to mention impossible to
accomplish), in this short article, a review of the constitutional
lawfulness under this paradigm of the hundreds of arguably
"Category II war power" situations that have occurred in our nation's history. 82 Instead, I will limit myself here to discussing the
two most important acts of congressional constitutional interpretation in this area in the past thirty years: The War Powers Resolution of 1973 and the 9-18-01 Resolution authorizing military
force in the present war. Both are extant, legally operative, authoritative congressional interpretations of the scope of presidential war powers, and each can be seen as fitting into Youngstown's paradigms.
A. THEW AR POWERS RESOLUTION AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Consider first the War Powers Resolution, passed by Congress and enacted into law over President Richard Nixon's veto
in 1973. As noted at the outset of this article, the War Powers
Resolution was and remains a highly contestable congressional
constitutional interpretation of the scope of presidential war
powers in the absence of a declaration of war or equivalent congressional authorization of presidential use of military force.
Whatever the validity of some of the WPR's commands to the
President-some of which are certainly unconstitutional and
others of which are highly dubious 83 -Congress's constitutional
interpretation of the branches' respective powers stands on its
own as a legitimate legislative enactment of Congress's constitutional views. The WPR explicitly begins, in section 2(a), with
constitutional interpretation. "It is the purpose of this chapter to
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United
States," the resolution announces, "and insure that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to
the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use
of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. " 84 After then
82. I hope to address these issues at greater length in a forthcoming book on the
war power.
83. I discuss these aspects of the War Powers Resolution presently. See infra pp.
246-249.
84. War Power Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1994 and Supp. V 1999). I will
hereinafter use the Public Law section numbers when discussing the War Powers Resolu-
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reciting, in subsection 2(b), Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass laws "for carrying into execution,
not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof," 85 the WPR proceeds, in subsection 2(c), to provide Congress's interpretation of the scope of the
President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-inChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
86
armed forces.

As an act of constitutional interpretation of the Constitution's allocation of the war power, this is not bad. It conforms
reasonably closely to what I have described above as the respective spheres of presidential and congressional power in this area,
including the President's power to defend the Nation against
sudden or imminent attack. It is simultaneously a congressional
recognition of, and limitation of, a class of situations involving legitimate presidential use of military forces outside of Category I
wars. It is a recognition of the reality of Category II war power
situations. But it is also an enacted statutory description of the
limits of Congress's "inertia, indifference or quiescence" with respect to such situations: Neither the President nor the courts
should construe Congress as conceding, through silence or inaction, unilateral presidential constitutional power to act, if it does
not fall within one of the three described circumstances.
The other bookend of the War Powers Resolution is section
8, which, while entitled "Interpretation of joint resolution," actually prescribes rules of interpretation not merely for the WPR
but for other congressional enactments, and for U.S. treaties as
well, as they might be thought to affect questions of presidential
authority to use the armed forces in situations of actual or probable hostilities. Section 8 imposes strict limits on how congressional enactments and treaties are to be construed with respect
to the issue of whether the President has been given statutory or
tion in the text, and use the parallel U.S. Code citations in the footnotes.
85. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b).
86. Id. § 1541(c).
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treaty authority to use military force. Section 8(a) provides that
"[a]uthority to introduce United States Armed Forces" into hostilities "shall not be inferred" from "any provision of law ... , including any provision contained in any appropriations Act"
unless such provision "specifically authorizes" such introduction
"and states that it is intended to constitute specJfic statutory authorization within the meaning of this chapter." 8 Similarly, such
authority is not to be inferred "from any treaty heretofore or
hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing" the President to use military force
and that states that it is intended to constitute such specific authorization within the meaning of the WPR. 88 Finally, after setting forth certain narrow exceptions to this rule 89 and reciting
that nothing in the WPR "is intended to alter the constitutional
authority of the Con~ress or of the President, or the provisions
of existing treaties," 9 section 8(d) concludes with a directive that
the WPR itself not be construed as conferring any statutory authority on the President:
Nothing in this chapter ... (2) shall be construed as granting
any authority to the President with respect to the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by
the circumstances which authority he would not have had in
the absence of this chapter. 91

In terms of Youngstown's paradigms, section 8 of the WPR
is a collection of prohibitions of inferences that otherwise might
be asserted to support a claim of Category II war power by the
President. Indeed, it is a rather clear, muscular repudiation of
any such inferences. No "inertia, indifference, or quiescence"
here: section 8 excludes, by clear congressional directive, any
middle ground of "Category II wars" lawfully being waged on
the claimed authority of debatable inferences from congressional
enactments or treaties. Either the President has delegated Article I war power pursuant to an explicit congressional enactment,
labeled as such, or he does not; if not, he must rely only on his
independent Article II war powers (the scope of which Congress
has sought to define in section 2's enactment of Congress's constitutional interpretation of the Commander-in-Chief clause).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 1547(a)(l) (emphasis added).
§ 1547(a)(2) (emphasis added).
§ 1547(b).
§ 1547(d)(l).
§ 1547(d)(2).
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The effect is to make the question of presidential war power
rather more categorically black-and-white-like Justice Black's
majority opinion in Youngstown-by forcing what otherwise
might be Category II war power situations into either Category I
or Category III. If Youngstown is right, this clear congressional
policy must be given effect. If the legislative enactments (and
non-enactments) discussed in Youngstown were insufficient to
support a claim of delegated power to seize the steel mills, all the
more clearly, under section 8's rules of construction, comparably
non-specific legislative actions touching on matters of war power
but not explicitly delegating power to employ military force are
insufficient to sustain a claim of legislatively-delegated presidential war authority. The legal reasoning of the Dames & Moore
case92 -sustaining presidential authority on the basis of a tradition of congressional deference to unilateral presidential action
settling claims combined with congressional legislation in the
neighborhood of granting the President such authority but not
in fact granting it-has no place in war powers, at least not so
long as the WPR's provisions remain the law. In sections 2 and 8
of the War Powers Resolution, Congress formally has enacted
into law an explicit lack of deference to any tradition of unilateral presidential war authority and an explicit rejection of the
propriety of inferring authority from legislation in the neighborhood of granting the specific authority at issue but not in fact
granting it.
Section 8's inference-prohibitions are, if anything, even
more clearly appropriate exercises of Congress's constitutional
powers than section 2's interpretation of the scope of the President's constitutional power. Congress is the master of its own
statutes and can prescribe rules of interpretation governing its
own statutes as surely as it may alter or amend the statutes directly.93 Similarly, with respect to treaties, Congress has power
to modify or repeal their effect as a matter of U.S. domestic law,
by passing statutes that accomplish such changes. 94 Moreover,
this type of expression of legislative will is explicitly what Justice
92. 453 u.s. 654, 675-88.
93. Professor Prakash and I develop this proposition in forthcoming work. Michael
Stokes Paulsen and Saikrishna Prakash, The Judicial Activism Abolition Act (provisional
title) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). For a fascinating defense of
Congress's power to prescribe rules of federal statutory interpretation, see Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085
(2002).
94. Chae Chin Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) ("The Chinese Exclusion
Case").
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Jackson's Category II contemplates: Congress's position"inertia, indifference, or quiescence" -matters to interpretation
of the extent of presidential power in a given context. It is thus
unquestionably appropriate for Congress to disclaim inertia, indifference, or quiescence and prescribe standing rules forbidding
construction of statutes and treaties from being so understood.
Between the bookends of section 2's constitutional interpretation and section 8's Category II inference-prohibitions are the
substantive requirements of the War Powers Resolution-the
direct "shall" provisions that purport to force the President to
take or not take specific actions with respect to the introduction
of military forces into situations of actual or imminent armed
conflict. As suggested above, these provisions are far more constitutionally problematic. Section 3 directs the President to consult with Congress before introducing armed forces into situations that are likely to involve such forces in hostilities.95 Section
4 requires that the President provide written reports and other
information in such circumstances. 96 And section 5 directs the
President to terminate use of such armed forces in a situation
where such report was required within sixty days, unless Congress has acted affirmatively or the President has submitted a
certification that an additional thirty days are needed. 97 In addition, section 5(c) provides that Congress may by "concurrent
resolution" (that is, without presentment to and approval by the
President) direct the President to remove armed forces from
such described situations.98
This last provision clearly cannot be given operative effect
consistently with the reasoning of INS v. Chadha, the case in
which the Supreme Court recognized the unconstitutionality of
legislative "vetoes" of the exercise of otherwise valid legislative
delegations of authority to the executive branch. 99 Beyond the
legislative veto problem, it is arguable that all of the substantive
provisions of the WPR unconstitutionally interfere with the
President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief of the
nation's military, if-and this is a big "if'-that power is legitimately being exercised by the President in the first place. Put
differently: If the President's military action falls within the
scope of his independent constitutional powers and outside Con95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

50 u.s.c. § 1542.
Id. § 1543.
Id. § 1544(b).
Id. § 1544(c).
462 u.s. 919 (1983).
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gress's power "to declare war," it is unconstitutional for Congress to direct, control, or regulate the President's action in any
way that would interfere with his independent constitutional
prerogative to act.
On the other hand, if the President in fact is acting ultra
vires in employing military force-that is, if he is exceeding his
legitimate executive and Commander-in-Chief constitutional
powers-these provisions of the War Powers Resolution (with
the exception of section 5(c)'s procedurally-defective "legislative veto" provision) are entirely legitimate congressional prohibitions of unconstitutional presidential action. In effect, they direct the President to stop acting unconstitutionally. Such a
requirement-a statutory command to another branch that it not
act in an unconstitutional manner, exceeding the scope of its true
constitutional powers-certainly falls within the scope of Congress's power to pass laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the (legitimate) powers of that branch. 100 To be sure,
such a command is in a sense redundant of what the Constitution
supposedly commands already (so that the statute's prohibitions
are merely cumulative, duplicating the Constitution's) and perhaps futile if the President persists in his unlawful action (or
holds, in good faith, a different interpretation of the Constitution's allocations of power), but that does not make Congress's
enactment improper. The most that can be said is that it might
make Congress's enactment superfluous, or ineffectual- useless
howling in the wind.
But in a constitutional regime in which congressional and
presidential war powers are recognized as overlapping and in
some respects concurrent, one must also recognize that the lawfulness of presidential military action in a given situation is affected by Congress's constitutional interpretation of the scope of
the President's authority. In this respect, the War Powers Resolution operates, somewhat ironically and probably unintentionally, to provide a constitutional "safe harbor" for certain unilateral presidential actions involving the use of military force-a
zone of nearly unchallengeable exercise of presidential power
100. For a defense of such an understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause
power, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (2000). For an
attack on this view, see Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of
Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Const. Comm. 191 (2001). For a reply and further defense,
see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lawson's Awesome (Also Wrong, Some), 18 Const. Comm.
231 (2001).
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within the zone of twilight marked by the overlap of congressional and presidential war powers, where Congress has by statute explicitly chosen to accept presidential military initiatives,
and where it is not clear that the Constitution of its own force
renders such presidential action unlawful.
Consider sections 3, 4, and 5 of the War Powers Resolution
in such light. These provisions can be understood less as effective, self-executing legal commands to the President than as part
of Congress's constitutional interpretation of the scope of the
President's constitutional power, consistent with the general
view expressed in section 2. Specifically, these provisions collectively establish the situations when presidential use of military
force will fall within a safe harbor of arguable consistency with
Congress's interpretation of presidential power under the Constitution as set forth in section 2 of the WPR. While the WPR
does not authorize presidential action within the sixty-day window of section 5(b)-recall section 8(d)(2)'s directive that nothing in the WPR "shall be construed as granting any authority to
the President" with respect to use of military forces-and while
presidential action within the sixty-day window is not necessarily
consistent with Congress's general view of the scope of the
President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief set
forth in section 2, the specific substantive commands and prohibitions of the WPR's middle sections can be understood as
marking the de facto boundaries of Congress's "quiescence" in
presidential exercises of Category II war power.
Similarly, while Congress might not legitimately be able to
command the President to remove troops from a given situation
(or as a practical matter might not be able to secure presidential
compliance with such a directive), Congress properly may declare, prospectively, that certain presidential military orders are,
in Congress's view, unconstitutional. That view is not wholly
without effect: As a legitimate congressional enactment into law
of its constitutional interpretation, that view necessarily will affect the judicial calculus in such a "Category II war" situation, in
the event such a question could come before a court. And it
should affect the executive branch's calculus in such a situation
as well: As noted, if Youngstown's paradigms are sound understandings of how the Constitution applies in such separation-ofpowers situations, they are sound understandings of the Constitution that ought to bind and constrain the executive branch
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whether or not they are enforceable against the executive by the
courts. 101
The substantive provisions of the War Powers Resolution
thus may be understood as part and parcel of the Resolution's
overall force as an act of congressional constitutional interpretation: In enacting the War Powers Resolution, Congress has said
that insofar as presidential war-making power might be thought
to depend on an inference from congressional action or inaction,
Congress as a standing rule has specifically repudiated any inference of authorization, quiescence, or indifference as being contrary to its intention. As far as Congress is concerned, there are
to be no Category II wars "authorized" by inference from treaties, appropriations acts, or any other legislative action or inaction short of specific authorization. 102 Moreover, to the extent
the President would interpret the Constitution as permitting him
to introduce armed forces into combat situations on his own authority, Congress's interpretation is that the Constitution does
not authorize presidential military action outside of the three
circumstances described in section 2(c)-declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergenc7a created by
attack upon the United States or its armed forces. 03 And the
President clearly lacks legitimate constitutional authority unilaterally to employ military force outside the de facto sixty day
"safe harbor" period marked by the WPR's substantive proviSIOnS.

Has Congress's apparent inability to enforce the War Powers Resolution against the executive waived its constitutional position? No. Just as the only authoritative way in which Congress
can assert its constitutional position is by passing legislation, so
too the only authoritative way in which Congress can retreat
from or alter that position is by passing legislation. The War
Powers Resolution, to the extent it stands as Congress's constitutional interpretation and as Congress's set of instructions as to

101. This is true no matter whether the executive branch or the judicial branch is
interpreting the Constitution. If Youngstown's approach is a sound, correct interpretation of the Constitution, it is a sound, correct interpretation of the Constitution whether
or not the issue at hand is, or ever could be made, the subject of a lawsuit. See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 907,916 (1994) ("A
constitutional violation is no less a constitutional violation simply because of the absence
of a judicial ruling to that effect. The President takes an oath to uphold the Constitution.
That duty exists whether the courts are able to act on a matter or not. The Constitution
is binding law for the executive branch as well as for the courts.")
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1547.
I 03. Id. § 1541.
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how other statutes and treaties are to be construed, is not, by the
fact of being (allegedly) violated, somehow thereby repealed.
But Congress of course may amend the WPR's constitutional interpretation by enacting subsequent legislation embodying a new, modified, or expanded constitutional interpretation of
presidential war power. It is in this respect (among others) that
the September 18, 2001 "Authorization for Use of Military
Force" -the Resolution that governs the present war on terrorism-constitutes a major constitutional event in the history of
war powers. The 9-18-01 Resolution changes everything.
B. THE 9-18-01 RESOLUTION AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The September 18 Resolution has both "Youngstown Category I" and "Youngstown Category II" war power elements, and
triggers broad presidential constitutional authority under both
categories. The resolution, structured as a series of "Whereas"
statements followed by the specific substantive authorization,
merits quotation in full:
PL 107-40
September 18, 2001
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Joint Resolution To authorize the use of United States
Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks
launched against the United States
Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United States and its citizens; and
Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense
and to protect United States citizens both at home and
abroad; and
Whereas, in light of the theat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts
of violence; and
Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy
of the United States; and
Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitu-
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tion to take action to deter and prevent acts of international
terrorism against the United States: Now therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for
Use of Military Force".
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) IN GENERAL.- That the President is authorized to use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
(b) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATIONConsistent with section 8(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution,
the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTSNothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the
War Powers Resolution.

This is a sweeping congressional enactment with respect to
war powers. In section 2(a), the President is specifically authorized, and delegated power in broad terms, to use force against
not only "nations," but also "organizations or persons" that "he
determines" "planned, authorized, committed or aided" the September 11 attacks "or harbored" such organizations or persons.
This is a sweeping delegation of "Category I" war power to the
President. It is not limited to specific nations or organizations.
The President is given substantial discretion to identify transgressors and thus targets of military action, including "organizations" and "persons." In addition, the Resolution contains no instruction as to the standard of proof, or degree of connectedness
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to the September 11 attacks, that is to limit the President's exercise of discretion. The targets are the ones "he determines"
were involved in some way in those attacks, including those that
"aided" the attacks and even those who "harbor[ ]" those who
"aided" the attacks. This is not a standardless delegation, nor a
blanket unqualified delegation of the entirety of the war power.
It states an "intelligible standard" for the President to apply, and
is thus constitutionally legitimate under any modem conception
of the limits of Congress's authority to legislate in very general
terms. 104 But it is an extraordinarily broad delegation-arguably
the broadest congressional delegation of war power in our nation's history. The President of the United States-President
Bush and his successors- is under no time limit. The authority
to use military force appears to exist until the President runs out
of (what he determines to be) legitimate targets. 105 Section 2(a)
of the 9-18-01 Resolution constitutes a truly extraordinary congressional grant to the President of extraordinary discretion in
the use of military power for an indefinite period of time. 106
In addition, the 9-18-01 Resolution's final "whereas" clause
constitutes an extraordinarily sweeping congressional recognition of independent presidential constitutional power to employ
the war power to combat terrorism. The Resolution declares
Congress's view that "the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and ~revent acts of international
terrorism against the United States." 07
It is worth pausing, briefly, to let this sink in: Congress has
embraced the "inherent presidential authority" view of the war
power, at least with respect to international terrorism. And it

104. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-74, 378-79 (1989). A different question might be presented were Congress to declare war against "all of America's enemies, present or future," and delegate to the President the authority to decide who should be deemed an
enemy. (I owe this hypothetical to my colleague Dan Farber.)
105. The last clause of Section 2(a) recites that this authority is granted "in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." It is unclear whether this clause broadens, narrows, or
does not affect the scope of authority granted in the preceding clauses. Most likely, it
simply establishes a purpose for which the grant of authority is conferred, but is neither
an enlargement of that grant nor a limitation on its exercise.
106. It is also remarkable that the congressional vote was nearly unanimous. The
vote was 420-1 in the House, vote 342 (available at <http://clerkweb.gov/cgi-binl
vote.exe?year=2001&rollnumber=342>), and 98-0 in the Senate, vote 281 (available at
<http://senate.gov/legislativevote1071/vote-00281.html>).
107. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (Sept. 18, 2001) (emphasis added).
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has embraced this position whole hog: The President may take
pre-emptive action to combat terrorism.
This is a new congressional interpretation of the scope of
presidential war powers. In effect, this clause of the 9-18-01
Resolution appears to revise and amend-more specifically, to
expand- the WPR's described categories of constitutionally
permissible presidential use of military force to include a fourth
category of presidential constitutional authority: Beyond declaration of war; beyond specific statutory authorization; beyond
even national emergency created by an attack on the United
States or its armed forces; the President "has authority under the
Constitution" to "take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States. " 108
This nearunanimous congressional interpretation of the Constitution essentially recognizes constitutional power in the President to conduct, in Youngstown terms, a "Category II War"on terrorism going beyond even the sweeping terms of the specificallyauthorized Category I War against those nations, organizations
or persons the President determines are responsible for, or assisted, the attacks of September 11, 2001. The 9-18-01 Resolution thus gives the President sweeping Category I war power
plus an equally sweeping congressional constitutional interpretive "penumbra" of a zone of independent presidential constitutional power surrounding it. Indeed, given the breadth of Congress's recognition of Category II war authority in the President
to combat terrorism, and the breadth of Section 2's explicit authorization, one could well speak of the Resolution as conferring
Category I authority plus recognizing "Category I W' war authority in the President.
There is nothing at all constitutionally improper about this.
Indeed, in many respects it seems a perfect illustration of
Youngstown's paradigms. As extraordinary as the 9-18-01 Resolution is, this broad grant-plus-concession-of-power combination

108. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (emphasis added). While the "Whereas" clauses do not themselves have the force
of a legal requirement and are not, strictly speaking, part of Congress's authorization for
the use of force, they are part of the legislation Congress has enacted into law, just as is
section 2 of the War Powers Resolution (containing Congress's declaration of "Purpose
and Policy"). One can accept the traditional canon that preambles and whereas clauses
c?nstitute no part of the substantive legislative enactment following the enacting clause,
Smger, ed., Sutherland Statutory Construction 123 (West Group, 2002), yet still recognize
that statements of legislative understandings embodied in such provisions are part of the
overall enactment. As such, they constitute valid, authoritative expressions, enacted into
statutory law, of Congress's interpretation of the Constitution.
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is constitutionally appropriate. As noted, Congress may delegate its war power so long as it supplies an intelligble standard
to guide the President's exercise of his discretion. 1 And, as argued above, Congress's constitutional interpretations in support
of presidential power, in a genuine "Category II war power"
situation of overlapping congressional and presidential authority, should be treated as dispositive of any separation-of-powers
legal challenge to the President's actions, unless it can be said
that Congress and the President are both wrong as a matter of
constitutional law.
It is hard to say that Congress's position in support of presidential power, embraced in the 9-18-01 Resolution, is not within
the range of legitimate interpretation of the Constitution's allocation of war power. If ever there was a cluster of situations falling within the "zone of twilight" marked out by the Constitution's division of the war power, it would seem to be the
situation described in the last "whereas" clause of the 9-18-01
Resolution: constitutional authority "to take action to deter and
prevent acts of international terrorism against the United
States." The President's traditional executive power to defend
the Nation against sudden or imminent prospective attack would
appear to cover such cases, but not clearly or absolutely so. The
more such presidential "action" to "deter and prevent" terrorism
tends to become pre-emptive and anticipatory; and the more it
involves offensive use of military force within the territory of
and against the forces of other nations for a sustained period of
time, the more strongly it also would appear to fall within Congress's constitutional power "to declare War." At the same time,
in most imaginable real-world instances of presidential military
action to deter and prevent international terrorism against the
United States it is genuinely hard to say that constitutional authority to act lies exclusively within the province of Congress's
power to declare war, such that Congress's and the President's
agreed understanding is contrary to a fixed rule of law supplied
by the Constitution. Across a broad range of circumstances,
Congress's interpretation of the Constitution in support of presidential constitutional power -its view, enacted as part of the 918-01 Resolution that "the President has authority under the
Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States" -is a legitimate and
constitutionally proper one.
109.

See note 104.

2002]

YOUNGSTOWN GOES TO WAR

255

When taken together with the broad "Category I" authorization for use of force, this expansive congressional "Category I
lh'' interpretation of presidential constitutional power answers
most separation-of-powers legal questions concerning war authority directed against terrorism, for the indefinite future. As
this article goes to print, one of the important issues of the current war is whether the President already possesses legal authority to take military action against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. 110
Under the 9-18-01 Resolution, it probably would not be difficult
for the President to determine that offensive military action
against Iraq is justified under the 9-18-01 Resolution, either because of a sufficient "aiding" or "harboring" connection between
the present Iraqi regime and persons, groups, or nations who
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks of September 11, 2001 (under section 2(a)'s specific authorization), or because the President deems such action necessary "to deter and
prevent" future acts of terrorism (under the last "whereas"
clause) because of evidence of development or attempted development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and evidence
of an intention to facilitate terrorist attacks against the United
States involving such weapons.
In short, under the legal paradigm within which we now operate, President George W. Bush appears to possess full constitutional authority to take whatever "action" he deems necessary,
including (but not necessarily limited to) the use of military
force, against Iraq and Saddam Hussein-or against any other
nation, organization, or person that he determines poses a legitimate threat of terrorism directed against the United States.
Such authority is explicit ("Category I") in the case of nations,
organizations, and persons involved in some way, direct or indirect, in the September 11 attacks. Such authority is implicit
("Category II" or "Category I lh'') in the case of nations, organizations, and persons not involved in the September 11 attacks
but posing a demonstrable risk of terrorism directed against the
United States, by virtue of the agreed constitutional interpretations of the President and Congress concerning presidential con-

II 0. Congress recently passed further, specific authority for the President to use
military force against Iraq. Authorization for use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolullon of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (Oct. 16, 2002). The implications of this
sweeping authorization are an important topic in their own right, but must await another
day.
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stitutional authority to act affirmatively to deter and prevent future terrorist aggression.'''
Such congressional endorsement of presidential authority
would appear to extend beyond use of military force. The last
whereas clause of the 9-18-01 Resolution speaks broadly of the
President's constitutional power to "take action." This could
fairly be understood to include such things as covert actions,
economic measures, and even authority to "try" and punish international terrorists for "crimes" under the rubric of the war
power rather than the domestic criminal justice system. Thus,
for example, insofar as President Bush's November 13, 2001 Order authorizing the establishment of military commissions might
111. Section 2(b)(2) of the 9-18-01 Resolution states that "[n]othing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution." Might this provision
be understood to negate Congress's endorsement of independent presidential constitutional power to act against terrorism in the final "whereas" clause? Almost certainly not:
Nothing in the 9·18-01 Resolution, including the final "whereas" clause, is inconsistent
with anything that the War Powers Resolution purports to require. Section 1541 of the
WPR describes Congress's constitutional interpretation of the President's Commanderin-Chief clause powers, but does not purport to impose any statutory "requirement." It
states the constitutional interpretation on which the requirements of subsequent sections
are based. The 9-18-01 Resolution appears to supplement and expand upon the WPR's
constitutional interpretation, but it does not purport to supersede any of the WPR's actual "requirement[s]".
Section 1544 of the WPR purports to state actual "requirements," but, as argued
above, those provisions are constitutionally valid and operative only where the President
is acting beyond the scope of his constitutional power-begging the whole question at
issue: Does the President have constitutional power to act, in this zone of uncertainty,
where Congress in the 9-18-01 Resolution has adopted a broad construction of independent presidential power? To the extent section S's provisions are properly viewed as a
"safe harbor" within which presidential action is deemed consistent with Congress's interpretation of the scope of the President's independent constitutional power, the 9-18-01
Resolution's endorsement of broad presidential power to combat terrorism does not appear to supersede a requirement of the War Powers Resolution. It merely modifies Congress's present constitutional interpretation of the scope of independent presidential
power.
Another legitimate interpretive issue is whether such a broad reading of the 9-18-01
Resolution's final "whereas" clause contradicts the interpretive canon of section 1547(a)
of the War Powers Resolution itself. Section 1547(a) states that "[a]uthority to introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities ... shall not be inferred (1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution) ... unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution." 50
U.S.C. § 1547(a). The short answer is that the 9-18-01 Resolution's "whereas" clause
does not purport to constitute statutory authorization for the President to act; it is technically not part of the substantive enactment conferring presidential authority. Rather, the
clause is a congressional interpretation of the President's constitutional powers. While the
WPR's interpretive canon probably forecloses reading the 9-18-01 "whereas" provision
as conferring statutory authority, nothing in the WPR forecloses Congress from modifying, and later expressing, its constitutional interpretations of the scope of legitimate independent presidential power.
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be thought to pose separation-of-powers issues of presidential
versus congressional authority (as opposed to issues arising under the Fifth or Sixth amendments), the 9-18-01 Resolution appears to resolve them in favor of presidential authority. 112
None of this is meant to constitute a normative judgment of
the wisdom of such a broad grant-plus-concession of presidential
war power. I mean only to describe what I believe is a dramatic,
watershed constitutional enactment with respect to the constitutional allocation of the power to wage war, and how it fits within
the paradigms of Youngstown Sheet & Tube. There are arguments strongly in favor of such an assignment of power to the
executive-the traditional arguments of unity, secrecy, initiative,
and dispatch in the conduct of foreign affairs and military operations. There are also arguments against such an assignment, including the difficulty of revoking such power once granted, the
broad terms in which the power is granted, and its indefinite duration. Whether Congress may one day regret having written
the Presidency so blank a check is a question for history. But the
existence of the blank check is, for now, a fact of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Youngstown Sheet & Tube has proven a remarkably durable
decision providing durable paradigms for interpreting the Constitution's allocations of power between Congress and the President in the areas of foreign affairs, war powers, and domestice
legislative authority. The holding of Youngstown is of enduring
significance: the President's executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers do not entail a unilateral presidential legislative power in
time of war, and the Constitution is a self-executing prohibition
of presidential usurpation of such power enforceable by the judiciary. The success of the Youngstown Court in enforcing this
principle fifty years ago, at a crucial point in our nation's history,
has been vital to the endurance of freedom in the United States
for half a century.

112. The November 13, 2001 Order cites the 9-18-01 Resolution as part of the legal
authority for the order authorizing military commissions. See 66 Fed. Reg. 57833. For
an argument against the validity of the November 13,2001 Order, see Neal K. Katyal and
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale
L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that President Bush's order lacks adequate
congressional authorization). For a persuasive response to this particular argument, see
Bradley and Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 Green
Bag at 249 (cited in note 21).
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Moreover, the analysis of Youngstown offers enduring
paradigms of constitutional interpretation for a text whose genius with respect to allocation of the war power in particular is
that it answers some questions clearly and leaves the resolution
of others uncertain, to be answered perhaps differently by different generations, as a function of the interaction of the views
of different branches armed with different aspects of a divided
power. Youngstown, as applied to the war power, reinforces the
conclusion that the President's executive and Commander-inChief powers do not entail a unilateral presidential constitutional power to initiate war. Rather, the war power is divided
between Congress and the President, with a good many of its
applications falling within a zone of twilight in which the
branches have concurrent authority, the precise distribution of
which is uncertain. In such cases, the constitutional interpretations of Congress and the President properly make a difference
as to the degree to which the Constitution may be thought to
pose a restriction on presidential action.
This, too, is a formula for enduring freedom. It preserves
flexibility for presidential action in times of crisis, but does so
without stating a rule of plenary presidential emergency power.
It permits the President to exercise great power in defense of the
nation. As the framers understood, there are times when the
ability of the government to exercise great power can be as vital
to freedom as the existence of restrictions on such power. 113 At
the same time, the formula withholds clarity and certainty from
the President's assertion of power where Congress has declined
to supply it. And it leaves presidential action of yet more doubtful constitutional legitimacy where Congress has by authoritative
legislative action-the passing of statutes-staked out a constitutional position against that of the President.
All of this is as it should be. Those who claim plenary, unilateral presidential war power do not have the support of the
Constitution. Those who claim entire congressional power over
the President in matters of national defense and the use of military force do not have the support of the Constitution either.
The Constitution of War is, like the Constitution in other impor113. Federalist 1 (Hamilton) 4 (cited in note 52) ("(T}he noble enthusiasm of liberty
is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand,
it will be equally forgotton, that the vigour of government is essential to the security of
liberty(.]); Federalist 23 (Hamilton) 111, 112 (cited in note 52) (defending position that
"there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the defence and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficary").
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tant respects, one of division, separation, and blending of-and
thus competition over-power.

